Kaseburg v. State, Bd. Of Land Com\u27rs Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 38917 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
7-2-2012
Kaseburg v. State, Bd. Of Land Com'rs Appellant's
Reply Brief Dckt. 38917
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Kaseburg v. State, Bd. Of Land Com'rs Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 38917" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3700.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3700
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Case No. 38917-2011 
PETER KASEBURG and SHELAGH KASEBURG, KASEBURG FAMILY TRUST 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
STATE OF IDAHO, BOARD OF LAND COMMISSIONERS, DEPARTMENT OF LANDS, 
Application Nos. ERL-96-S-219B and ERL-96-S-291C 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial District for BOlmer County 
Honorable Steve Verby, District Judge 
STEVEN J. SCHUSTER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Office of the Attorney General 
Idaho Department of Lands 
700 W. State Street, 2nd Floor 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
Attorney for Appellants 
JOHN A. FINNEY 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
120 E. Lake Street, #317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Attorney for Respondents 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE NO. 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................................... 1 
A. Statement of Facts ................................................................................................................ 1 
II. ARGUMENT ........................................................................................................................... 5 
A. Standard of Review .............................................................................................................. 5 
B. The Applicants Fail to Rebut IDL's Interpretation ofIdaho § 58-1302(h) ......................... 6 
C. IDL Has Recognized the Applicants' Littoral Rights and the Denial of the Subject Permit 
Applications Does Not Deny The Applicants' Property Rights .......................................... 9 
D. IDL's Rules and Actions In This Case Are In Accordance With the Public Trust Doctrine 
As Articulated by Statute and Case Law ........................................................................... 15 
E. The Applicants Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees In This Matter .................................... 18 
III. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 18 
1 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE NO. 
Cases 
Brett v. Eleventh Street Dockowner 's Assoc. Inc., 141 Idaho 517, 522-23, 112 P.3d 805, 
810-11 (2005) ...................................................................................................................... 10, 13 
Driesbach v. Lynch, 71 Idaho 501, 509, 234 P.2d 446, 451 (1951); ...................................... 10, 14 
DuPont v. Idaho State Board of Land Comm 'rs, 134 Idaho 618,625, 7 P.3d 1095, 1102 
(2000) ....................................................................................................................................... 12 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126,219 P.3d 448,450 (2009 ........... 5 
fllinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Rlinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892) ........................................................ 17 
JR. Simplot Co. v.ldaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206,1219 (1991) .. 7 
Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 628-29, 
671 P.2d 1085, 1091-92 (1983) .......................................................................................... 16, 17 
Lake CDA Investments, LLC v. Idaho Department of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 278, 233 P.3d 721, 
725 (2010) ................................................................................................................................... 5 
Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 326-28, 78 P.3d 389,393-95 (2003) ................................... 10 
Swanson v. United States, 789 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986) .................................................. 12 
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000) ......................................... 5 
West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 554, 511 P.2d 1326, 1330 (1973) .............................................. 9, 11 
Statutes 
Idaho Code § 12-117 ..................................................................................................................... 18 
Idaho Code § 58-1202(5) .............................................................................................................. 17 
Idaho Code § 58-1203 ................................................................................................................... 16 
Idaho Code § 58-1203(1) .............................................................................................................. 17 
Idaho Code § 58-1203 (2) and (3) ................................................................................................. 17 
Idaho Code § 58-1302(f) ................................................................................................................ 9 
Idaho Code § 58-13 02(g) .............................................................................................................. 10 
Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) .............................................................................................. 6,7,8,9,18 
Idaho Code § 58-1302(i) ................................................................................................................. 7 
Idaho Code § 58-1305 ..................................................................................................................... 9 
11 
Idaho Code § 58-1305(e) ................................................................................................................ 8 
Idaho Code § 58-1305(e)(2) ............................................................................................................ 8 
Idaho Code § 58-1306 ..................................................................................................................... 8 
Idaho Code § 67-5249(3) ................................................................................................................ 5 
Idaho Code § 67-5275 ..................................................................................................................... 5 
Idaho Code § 73-116 ..................................................................................................................... 17 
Title 58, Chapter 12, Idaho Code ...................................................................................... 15,17,18 
Other Authorities 
Black's Law Dictionary, p. 568 (8th ed. 2004) .............................................................................. 16 
Kearney, James M., Recent Statute Closing the Floodgates? Idaho's Statutory Limitation 
on the Public Trust Doctrine, 34 Idaho L. Rev. 91, 93-97 (1997) ........................................... 17 
Rules 
LR.C.P. 84 ....................................................................................................................................... 6 
IDAPA 20.03.04.010.16 ................................................................................................................. 1 
IDAPA 20.03.04.010.27 ................................................................................................................. 6 
IDAPA 20.03.04.010.30 ............................................................................................................... 15 
IDAPA 20.03.04.015.13.c. and e .................................................................................................. 12 
IDAPA 20.03.04.030.02 ......................................................................................................... 15, 16 
IDAPA 20.03.05.010.17 ................................................................................................................. 2 
IDAPA20.03.17.020 .................................................................................................................... 11 
III 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Statement of Facts. 
There are a number of factual corrections and clarifications of the record that are 
necessary in reply to the Respondents' Brief 
The Plaintiffs-Respondents Peter and Shelagh Kaseburg and the Kaseburg Family Trust 
("Applicants") make statements in the Respondents' Brief such as the following: (1) the subject 
encroachments "principally consist of piling created and used primarily in aid of navigation. The 
piling and dolphins (groups of three piling) were established to dock a boat house." 
Respondents' Brief, pp. 23-24; (2) "Further, there is no basis in the Lake Protection Act to deny 
replacement based upon either a change in use (which there was not) or even a period of lack of 
use (which there was not)." Jd., p. 26; (3) "The appellants also want to ignore the moorage 
evidence of moorage [sic] to the pilings." Jd., p. 31; (4) "Several of the [IDL's] arguments 
admit that the pilings were used for navigation." Jd., p. 32. 
Because it is important to the resolution of this case, it bears repeating: There is no 
evidence in the record that the pilings at issue were ever used for a navigational purpose. To the 
contrary, local residents with long personal or family history at Glengary Bay all stated to the 
State of Idaho, et aI., ("IDL") that there has never been any navigational use of the pilings, and 
the pilings are a navigational hazard. 219B, Ex. 033-061. The only use of the pilings that was 
identified in 1974 was the use of one wood pile to suspend a water intake line. 219B, Ex. 087, 
096. A portion of a float house was moored, temporarily, while the ovo/ners built a home on the 
shore in the 1930's. 219B 114. Even if some of the pilings had been used to "dock a boat 
house," a boat house or a float home is not a navigational use and the pilings would not have 
been in support of a navigational use. IDAP A 20.03.04.010.16 (float home considered an 
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encroachment not in aid of navigation).! There is no evidence in the record to support the 
statement that "the piling and dolphins ... were established to dock a boat house." Respondents' 
Brief, pp. 23-24. The opinion of Applicant Peter Kaseburg as to the past navigational use of the 
pilings is limited to what local residents told him because, as of the reconsideration hearing 
2009, he has ovvned the property for less than two years, and was aware of no other use. 219B, 
Ex. 102, 109. 
The Applicants statement at page 13 of the Respondents' Brief that "[t]here is no showing 
of any actual hazard existing" due to the subject pilings ignores the record and common sense. 
As recognized by the Bonner County Sheriff s Office, the Idaho Department of Fish and Game, 
and all other commentors, these pilings pose a navigational hazard. 219B, Ex. 033, 035, 046, 
050, 052, 054, 056-58, 060. Photographs in the record illustrate this hazard. 219B, Ex. 004-06, 
012, 018, 026, 038, 041-44. Normally, public officials attempt to address public safety hazards 
before there is injury or death, a policy the Applicants ignore in asserting that the hazard is not 
"actual." Contrary to the Applicants' statement, the only function of the pilings is as a hazard 
and deterrent to navigation. 
There is no evidence in the record to support the Applicants' contention that "[t]he State 
of Idaho has taken the position that a property owner can only enjoy littoral rights from their 
property for the approximately one-sixth of the year that the lake is held at summer pool." 
Respondents' Brief, p. 12. This issue is discussed more fully in Section II.C., irifra. 
The Applicants contend the mooring buoy in the 219C application would extend out a 
maximum of 195 feet from the artificial righ water mark (AHWM), and "not out three hundred 
feet as previously asserted." Respondents' Brief, p. 12. The record shows that in the original 
1 A "floating home" or "float home" is defIned as "[a] structure that is designed and built to be used, or is 
modifIed to be used, as a stationary waterborne residential dwelling and is not self-propelled ..... " IDAPA 
20.03.05.0lO.17. 
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219B application, they stated that the encroachment would extend out 360 feet from the AHWM. 
219B, Ex. 001.2 On page 28 of the Respondents' Brief, the Applicants assert that the line of 
navigability in this part of the lake is 280 feet from the artificial high water mark presumably 
because that is the furthest extent of the existing pilings. This 280 foot figure also comports with 
the scaled drawing submitted by Mr. McLean in 1974, the furthest piling measuring about 275 
feet from the artificial high water mark. 219B, Ex. 87. The Applicants show that the piling 
furthest from shore is at about 255 feet in one of the scaled drawing. 219C, Ex. 005. The 219C 
application proposed relying upon the fourth piling from the outermost, about 240 feet from the 
i\HVv'M. fd. A commentor, Mr. Congleton, pointed out that in reality, according to the 219C 
proposal, the anchor buoy would be 190 feet into the bay, but to that you must add the fact that 
there is proposed a 30-foot sailboat to be tethered an additional 30-40 feet from the buoy, making 
the actual distance about 250 feet, depending on wind direction. 219C, Ex. 040. In other words, 
the 219B application would have perpetuated an encroachment about 280 feet from shore, and 
the 219C moveable dock would extend out to about 250. As discussed in Section II.C., infra, 
this lengthy encroachment into Glengary Bay is part of the reason that the proposal would 
unreasonably interfere with adjacent littoral rights and navigation. 
The Applicants states that "piling placed above the ordinary high water mark are upon the 
private property ownership (the Kaseburg's property)." Respondents' Brief, p. 32. It appears, 
however, that the pilings are all located below the ordinary high water mark of the lake because 
the pilings were placed before the lake level was raised by the Albeni Falls Dam. 219B, Ex. 033, 
34,047,066,087. 
2 This reference to 360 feet by the Applicants is likely the reason for the reference by Mr. Congleton to 360 
feet in his comments to IDL. 219B, Ex. 034. 
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The Applicants also allege that IDL's factual record in this matter relies upon "a biased 
neighbor long removed from the events of the days of 1933 when the significant investment to 
install the numerous piling occurred." Respondents' Brief, p 32. This allegedly biased neighbor 
is not identified, and there is no evidence in the record to support this contention. Additionally, 
it is ironic that the Applicants criticize this neighbor for being "long removed" from the events of 
1933 when the Applicants were unfamiliar with this property until about 2007. 219B, Ex. 102, 
142, 1 13. Many of the cornrnentors have an extensive history of living and vacationing at 
Glengary Bay. 219B, Ex. 046, 056 (children of people who established the marina in the 
1940's); 059-061 (Mark Nelson, whose family history in Glengary Bay goes back to the 1920's 
and who was a personal friend of Doug McLean). 
At page 5 of the Respondents} Brief, the Applicants state that the original denial of the 
219B application "did not address the modification submitted" during the 219B application 
process. This was explained more fully during the 219B reconsideration hearing and in IDL's 
Conclusions of Law concerning the reconsideration hearing. 219B, Ex. 117-119, 124-25, 141,1 
9. The 219C application with the moveable dock was submitted while the 219B application was 
pending. 219B, Ex. 125-126. The proposed modifications were considered in the 219C 
application. 
Finally, the Applicants complain that IDL "wants to make much ado" about the impact of 
the Applicants' proposals on the adjacent littoral owners, and that "[i]n fact, the proposed 
moveable dock and mooring buoy would lessen the impact upon neighboring littoral ovvners (and 
the public), when compared to the existing piling. Respondents' Brief, p. 13. These statements 
are not supported in the record and the impact on adjacent littoral rights forms part of the basis 
for IDL's denial of the subject applications, as discussed more fully in Section II.C., infra. 
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II. ARGUMENT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
The Applicants contend that IDL's briefing of this case erroneously "focuses on the 
District Court's decision, rather than the underlying denials of the Kaseburgs' applications." 
Respondents' Brief, p. 10. 
IDL's focus, however, is correct. As set forth in Appellant's Brief at 8, "[w]hen the 
district court acts in its appellate capacity, we review the decision of the district court to 
determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented on appeal." Lake CDA Investments, 
LLC v. Idaho Department of Lands, 149 Idaho 274, 278, 233 P.3d 721, 725 (2010) (quoting 
Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 126,219 P.3d 448, 450 (2009). The 
District Court was acting in an appellate capacity in the case at hand. This Court reviews the 
decision of the District Court, but "reviews the agency record independently of the district 
court's decision." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000) 
(citations omitted). 
The Applicants appear to suggest that the "cumulative" nature of IDL's records 
concerning dock permitting and littoral properties may justify reference to all IDL records 
concerning the parcel of land and encroachments in question, whether or not part of the record 
on appeal. Respondents' Brief, p. 11. 
Idaho Code § 67-5249(3) states, however, that other than for exceptions inapplicable in 
this case, "the agency record constitutes the exclusive basis for agency action in contested cases 
under this chapter or for judicial review thereof." IDL submitted the agency records for judicial 
review in this matter, and the records were settled in accordance with Idaho Code § 67-5275 and 
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I.R.C.P. 84. The Applicants made no objection to the record for either the 219B or 219C 
applications, and the current record forms the basis for judicial review. 
B. The Applicants Fail to Rebut IDL's Interpretation of Idaho § 58-B02(h). 
In the Appellants' Brief, pp. 9-19, it explained the District Court's error in interpretation 
of Idaho Code § 58-1302(h), the definition of encroachments in aid of navigation, and its 
conclusion that all "pilings" are as a matter of law "navigational." IDL asserts that the District 
Court's ruling turns on this interpretation and is central to the resolution of this case. 
In response to this argument, the Applicants agree that the District Court's decision turns 
on the interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) Respondent's Brief, p. 36. The Applicants do 
not directly refute the State's statutory analysis, but simply make a number of conclusions 
without support, such as pilings are by statute an encroachment in aid of navigation, that the 
District Court's conclusion does not lead to absurd result, and that IDL's rules are ineffective to 
the extent that they are inconsistent with statute. Respondents} Brief, pp. 39-40. 
The Applicants' response is misdirected for several reasons. First, IDL does not assert 
that its administrative rules control the interpretation of the statute. IDL cited its definition of 
"pilings," IDAP A 20.03.04.010.27 to illustrate that its definition is consistent with the dictionary 
definition. Appellants} Brief, p. 12, n. 6. Second, IDL does not assert that "the statutory 
language is ambiguous when read in conjunction with the entire Lake Protection Act .... " 
Respondents} Brief, p. 39. IDL asserts that the term "pilings" must be interpreted in the context 
of the same definition in which the word appears, Idaho Code § 58-1302(h), and in pari materia 
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with the definition of nonnavigational encroachments, Idaho Code § 58-1302(i) Appellants' 
Brief, pp. 12, 14? 
As a starting point in statutory interpretation, it is necessary to understand the plain 
meaning of every word in the statute. The District Court did not do this, and defining the term 
"pilings" is essential to applying the law to the facts of the case. The dictionary meaning of the 
term "pilings" is undisputed. Appellants' Brief, pp. 11-13. Once that term was defined, it was 
further shown that the District Court ignored the word "such" in the definition to establish that 
the preceding phrase is illustrative, not definitional, and that pilings are navigational only when 
used to aid navigation because not all pilings are constructed to aid navigation. Id., pp. 12-13. 
The Applicants have not addressed IDL's statutory analysis, nor have they explained why 
the District Court's interpretation, which would necessarily establish that every piling placed in 
any lake in the past and in the future would be "navigational" regardless of its actual use, is not 
absurd. Neither have they addressed the deference that should be accorded IDL in its 
interpretation ofIdaho Code § 58-1302(h) based upon the factors set forth in JR. Simplot Co. v. 
Idaho State Tax Comm 'n, 120 Idaho 849, 862, 820 P.2d 1206, 1219 (1991). IDL's experience in 
administering the LP A is an important consideration in interpretation of the statute. 
The interpretation of Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) and the meaning of the word "pilings" is 
central to the resolution of this case because the District Court's holding and the Applicants' 
arguments depend upon the assumption that "pilings" are as a matter of law navigational. As has 
been shown by IDL, a piling is a structure that mayor may not be navigational, depending on its 
use. The facts of this case show that the pilings at issue have never supported navigational use 
3 At page 37 of the Respondents' Brief, they state that "the common use of the term 'piling' .... " supports 
their contention that pilings are encroachments in aid of navigation. The "common use" of a term is normally what 
the dictionary defrnes, as set forth in the Appellants' Brief, pp. 11-13. 
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and have been abandoned for any apparent use, other than one piling used to support a water 
intake, for over 70 years, and are thus nonnavigationaL 
If, as asserted by IDL, the subject pilings are nonnavigational, then much of the 
Applicants' argument in this matter fails. For example, the argument in portions of Section IV 
and in Section V of the Respondents' Brief, pp. 18-27, is premised upon the Applicants' 
assumption that the pilings in dispute are navigational as a matter of law. Similarly, Section VI. 
of the Respondents' Brief, pp. 27-29, contends that the existing pilings establish the line of 
navigability of the area in question. The record shows that the pilings never supported 
navigational use. The undisputed facts should not be ignored in favor of an interpretation of 
Idaho Code § 58-1302(h) that mistakenly labels all pilings as "navigational" regardless of actual 
use. The currently-existing Idaho Code § 58-1305(e), not in effect until 2010, would not allow 
the Applicants to replace the wood pilings with metal pilings as proposed in the 219B application 
because Section 1305 applies only to navigational encroachments, and Idaho Code § 58-
1305(e)(2) requires that such replacements be permittable under current standards. 
With respect to the 219C application, since the existing pilings do not establish a line of 
navigability, and the proposed moveable dock would extend well beyond the existing line of 
navigability, it was correctly processed pursuant to Idaho Code § 58-1306, not Idaho Code § 58-
1305. 
IDL correctly applied Idaho Code § 58-1302Ch) to the facts of the case, and this Court 
should hold that the subject pilings were correctly characterized as "nonnavigational" given the 
undisputed record showing these structures were never used in support of navigation. 
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C. IDL Has Recognized the Applicants' Littoral Rights and the Denial of the 
Subject Permit Applications Does Not Deny The Applicants' Property 
Rights. 
The main theme of the Applicants' argument is that although the District Court's decision 
turns on the interpretation ofIdaho Code § 58-1302Ch) "[tJhe central issues in this matter are the 
Kaseburgs' littoral rights." Respondents) Brief, p. 36. The Applicants thus spend most of its 
brief discussing the nature of littoral rights, the Applicants' littoral rights, and how those rights 
were allegedly "not considered" and violated by IDL. 
As a threshold matter, there is no question that the Applicants, by virtue of ownership of 
real property on the shore of a navigable lake, possess littoral rights. IDL recognized this fact 
when it accepted the 219B and 219C encroachment applications because only owners or lessees 
of littoral rights are qualified to construct lake encroachments. 219B, Ex. 140, , 5; see Idaho 
Code § 58-1302(f) (definition ofriparian or littoral rights). Littoral rights include (1) the right of 
access to the water, and (2) the right, "subject to state regulation, to build wharves and piers in 
aid of navigation." West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 554, 511 P.2d 1326, 1330 (1973) (emphasis 
added; footnotes omitted); see also Idaho Code § 58-1302(f) (littoral rights means "the rights of 
O\vners ... to maintain their adjacency to the lake and to make use of their rights ... in building 
or using aids to navigation .... ) 
A littoral right is a unique property right. "One of the salient features of the shores of 
navigable lakes is the convergence of the rights and interests of the state, the public, and the 
littoral landowner." West, 95 Idaho at 554, 511 P.2d at 1330. Additionally, adjacent shore line 
owners also have littoral rights that must be considered. The Applicants have mostly ignored 
IDL's rationale for denying the subject permits, as well as the comments from public officials 
and neighbors. Their only recognition other interests in the area in question comes from the 
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Applicants' comment that IDL makes "muchado" about the concerns of the neighbors, and the 
conclusory statement that the movable dock and mooring buoy would lessen the impact 
compared to the existing pilings. Respondents' Brief, p. 13. The Applicants focus solely on their 
own property rights, while IDL must consider both public rights and the interests of neighboring 
littoral owners where they converge in Glengary Bay. 
The Applicants assert "[IJittoral rights and the line of navigability are dependent upon the 
specific parcel of property and the conditions and circumstances of Lake Pend Oreille at the 
property." Respondents' Brief, p. 14. This statement is accurate with respect to a determination 
of the extent oflittoral rights, as this Court has previously recognized. Driesbach v. Lynch, 71 
Idaho 501, 509, 234 P.2d 446,451 (1951); Brett v. Eleventh Street Dockowner's Assoc. Inc., 141 
Idaho 517, 522-23, 112 P.3d 805, 810-11 (2005) (discussing Driesbach and IDL's determination 
of littoral rights in specific instances); Lovitt v. Robideaux, 139 Idaho 322, 326-28, 78 P.3d 389, 
393-95 (2003) (discussing IDL determination oflittoral rights in specific instances). 
The Applicants are incorrect, however, in stating that the line of navigability may differ 
from property to property. Prior to 2006, the definition of "line of navigability," Idaho Code § 
58-1302(g), referred to access to low water based upon the draft for water craft customarily used 
in a particular lake. Presently, the line of navigability is defmed as the line such a distance 
"waterward of the low water mark established by the length of existing legally permitted 
encroachments, water depths waterward of the low water mark, and by other relevant criteria 
determined by the board when a line has not already been established for the body of water in 
question." (Emphasis added.) In other words the focus for the line of navigability is on water 
existing permitted encroachments and "other criteria" when the line has not been 
established "for the body of water in question." Plainly, the statute requires the line of 
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navigability to be applied consistently to all littoral owners in a given area, not on an owner-by-
owner basis. 
As set forth in the Appellant's Brief, pp. 22-23, IDL has determined the line of 
navigability in the area in question to be 55' below the artificial high water mark. 219C, Ex. 
038, 041, 045-046, 050-051. The Applicants' response is that "[t]he Department continues to 
assert that its arbitrary 55 foot length controls as to the line of navigability." Respondents' 
Brief, p. 31. The Applicants, however, have no basis to contend that this determination is 
"arbitrary." This line of navigability is generally knovvn in the community. 219C, Ex. 38, 41. 
Mr. Bringhurst recently permitted a dock in Glengary Bay based upon this consideration. 219B, 
Ex. 050. IDL staff also identified this generally-known fact in the record, 219C, Ex. 050-051.4 
The Applicants may disagree with the line of navigability that has been established, but it is not 
arbitrary. 
In their effort to advance their argument, the Applicants have conflated two separate 
aspects of littoral rights, that is, (1) the right of access to the water and (2) the right to construct 
navigational aids subject to IDL regulation. The Applicants cite West for the scope of the littoral 
rights of a lake front owner, noting that the right of access to the lake attaches at all points of an 
owner's shoreline. Respondents' Brief, p. 16. Emphasis is added to this quotation apparently in 
order to support the Applicants' contention that they are entitled to build a dock at any point 
along the shoreline. West did not involve the right to a dock, it involved the right of access, and 
the conflict in the case was about a moored houseboat that blocked the shore line owner's access 
to the lake. West, 95 Idaho at 553, 511 P.2d at 1329. A right to access at all points of the 
4 A commercial marina, such as the marina on the shore of Glengary Bay opposite the Applicants' 
property, is normally not considered evidence of the line of navigability because of the commercial nature ofthe 
facility, and the fact that it provides moorage to the public that may not own littoral property. Additionally, such 
commercial facilities must obtain a submerged land lease from IDL for commercial use of the public lakebed. 
IDAPA 20.03.17.020, Rules Governing Leases on State-Owned Submerged Lands and Formerly Submerged Lands. 
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shoreline does not mean a right to build a dock at any point desired. The specific location of 
docks along a shoreline may be regulated by IDL. See e.g. IDAPA 20.03.04.015.13.c. and e. 
(dock location is controlled in part to prevent one littoral o\vner from infringing upon the littoral 
rights of another). 
As set forth in DuPont v. Jdaho State Board of Land Comm'rs, 134 Idfu~o 618, 625, 7 
P.3d 1095, 1102 (2000) IDL may consider an intended use of a proposed encroachment in its 
permitting decisions. \Vith respect to permitting the 219C dock application, it is important to 
highlight a few facts that bear on the proposal: (1) The Applicants own about 975 feet of 
shoreline. 219C, Ex. 006. There was discussion about moving the proposed 219C dock to a 
different location on the Applicants' shoreline when neighbors, with experience with the 
conditions in this area, commented on the proposal and suggested an alternative location to 
satisfy the need for winter moorage. 219C, Ex. 013, 041-42. (2) The 219C application is 
intended for mooring a 30-foot sailboat that needs 7-112 feet of draft. 219C, Ex. 003, 012-014. 
This is a large boat that the applicants are seeking to moor all year in a bay with a very gradual 
slope. 219C, Ex. 012-14. (3) Lake Pend Oreille is managed by the U.S. Army Corp of 
Engineers. Swanson v. United States, 789 F.2d 1368, 1369 (9th Cir. 1986). The lake level 
fluctuates with Corps management, and flowage easements were acquired by the United States in 
order to flood lands previously above the OHWM. Jd One way that littoral owners deal with 
that problem is by building an underwater rail system to lower their boats into the water when 
the lake level is low. 219C, Ex. 012, 042. (4) The Applicants proposed the 219C application 
not to provide for year round boating, but to maintain their wooden-hulled boat in the water at all 
times to prevent cracking of the hull. 219C, Ex. 012. Generally, boating on Lake Pend Oreille 
ill winter is limited to smaller fishing craft. 219B, Ex. 053. 
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IDL's decision to deny the219C application must be viewed in the context of these facts. 
The Applicants demand that they are entitled to build this dock system with these specifications 
at this specific location. Access to low water does not necessarily mean access to low water at 
any chosen point along the shoreline because there may be converging interests. A littoral 
owner's right of access must be balanced against public navigational use and the rights of 
neighboring landowners. There is, moreover, no evidence in the record to support the 
Applicants' conclusion that "[t]he State ofIdaho has taken the position that a property o'wner can 
only enjoy littoral rights from their property for the approximately one-sixth of the year that the 
lake is held at summer pool. Respondents' Brief, p. 12. IDL advised the Applicants of the 
problems with this proposal during the permitting process, and neighbors had suggested 
alternatives, and offered observations of the weather and lake in this area over a longer period of 
time. The use of underwater rails to raise and lower a boat during water fluctuation was 
discussed, but the Applicants rejected this option because their purpose is not to maintain year 
round access for navigation, but to prevent a wooden hull from cracking. 219C, p. 012. 
In trying to resolve disputes such as the one at hand, IDL commonly tries to find a 
solution that is acceptable to all parties. See Brett, 141 Idaho at 519-20, 112 P.3d at 807-08 (IDL 
initially tried to resolve Brett's objection to moored houseboats by fmding the Association in 
violation of its encroachment permit and having the boats moved lakeward in an attempt to meet 
Brett's objection); 219C. Ex. 032 (IDL seeks input from other agencies for suggestions on how 
the applicant's needs might be met by other means). It is in that context that IDL pointed out to 
the Applicants that the necessary deep water moorage could be found at the neighboring marina. 5 
5 The Applicants take the statement by Mr. Brady ofIDL at the 219B reconsideration hearing that "[tJhe 
department did not, does not have to guarantee year round access, especially when you have an alternative with a 
marina very close" out of context. 219B, Ex. 126. This statement must be read in the context of the hearing, 
wherein alternative mooring was discussed in an attempt to assist the Applicants, and that IDL does not have to 
13 
Given that the record shows how the 219C proposal would create a navigational hazard in the 
mouth of a shallow bay, it is not unreasonable for the Applicants to also explore placement of the 
novel, specialized storage facility at some other point of the approximately 975 feet of shoreline 
that they own on the lake. 
By focusing solely on their own littoral rights, the Applicants forget other shoreline 
ovvners also possess littoral rights. The impact of both the 219B and 219C proposals on the 
neighbors and public is well documented in the record by the written comments from individuals 
and public agencies. The Applicants give short shrift to those comments by accusing IDL of 
making "much ado" about the impact on the neighbors, and stating without evidence that the 
proposed dock would have less impact on the neighbors. Respondents' Brief, p. 13. The record 
shows otherwise. 
Finally, the Applicants cite Driesbach v. Lynch, 71 Idaho 501, 234 P.2d 446 (1951) in 
support of their argument that the Applicants are entitled to deep water moorage adjacent to their 
littoral property at low water. Although Driesbach is a case involving littoral rights, not the line 
of navigability, this Court's observations bear repeating here: "the courts have not hesitated to 
point out that these rules [concerning allocation of littoral rights] often require modification 
under the peculiar circumstances of the case in order to secure equal justice, and that where such 
is the case the courts do not hesitate to invoke a modification to attain such objective." 
Driesbach, 71 Idaho at 509, 234 P.2d at 451. The Applicants appear to contend that their littoral 
rights entitle them to occupy a disproportionate area in Glengary Bay based upon the peculiar 
facts of the instant case. The record illustrates the shallow nature of the subject bay, the location 
of adjacent littoral rights, the impact of the proposals on those rights, and that the Applicants 
guarantee year round access in this location for this purpose. As counsel for the Applicants observed at the 
conclusion of the hearing, "I appreciate everyone's ability to have a cordial discussion over this. It, it's a process." 
219B, Ex. 129. 
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plan to create what would be an obvious navigational hazard, all so that they can maintain a 
wooden-hulled boat in water all year to prevent cracking. But the record illustrates the problems 
associated with such convergence of littoral rights and congestion that would occur in the bay if 
the Applicants' plan was approved, as well what could happen if the other owners do the same. 
IDL's actions in this case have not deprived the Applicants of their littoral rights. The 
Applicants hold littoral rights as owners of property on the shore of Lake Pend Oreille. The 
subject permit applications were denied based upon the specifics of those applications, but 
without prejudice to apply for and receive a lake encroachment permit that meets LP A standards. 
The Applicants are in the same position holding littoral rights as they were before the current 
dispute. Thus, no substantial rights of the Applicants have been prejudiced and IDL' s decisions 
should be affirmed by this Court. 
D. IDL's Rules and Actions In This Case Are In Accordance With the Public 
Trust Doctrine As Articulated by Statute and Case Law. 
The Applicants contend that administrative Rules enacted by the Idaho Department of 
Lands, and its decisions in this case, are contrary to the Public Trust Doctrine as articulated by 
Idaho Courts and the Idaho Legislature. Specifically, the Applicants contend without citation 
that the definition of the Public Trust Doctrine in the LPA Rules, IDAPA 20.03.04.010.30 is 
directly contrary [to] the decisions of the Idaho Appellate Courts and directly contrary to the 
legislative action in 1996 adopting Title 58, Chapter 12, Idaho Code, regarding littoral rights and 
regarding the public trust doctrine." Respondents' Brief, p. 33. Additionally, the Applicants 
contend that IDAP A 20.03.04.030.02, which address encroachments not in aid of navigation, is 
contrary to the Public Trust Doctrine and Idaho Code title 58, chapter 12, because "[iJt is an error 
to apply a standard that there must not be any detrimental effect, when the standard is to compare 
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and weigh both benefits, public or private, and the detriments, public or private." Respondents' 
Brief, p. 35. 
The Applicants' first error is in concluding that "the Public Trust Doctrine applies to the 
disposition of the publicly held title to the beds of navigable waters." Respondents' Brief, p. 34 
(emphasis added). This ignores the plain language of Idaho Code § 58-1203, which accurately 
describes the Public Trust Doctrine as a limitation on the power of the State to "alienate or 
encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters as defmed in this chapter. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court has similarly recognized that the Public Trust Doctrine applies not only to the 
alienation of title to Public Trust Resources, but also to "impairment" of such resources. 6 
Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 105 Idaho 622, 628-29, 
671 P.2d 1085, 1091-92 (1983) ("KEA") (explanation of the adoption of various state approaches 
to implementation of the Public Trust Doctrine as applied to alienation or impairment of Public 
Trust resources). Any encroachment authorization, including a dock permit, results in some 
"encumbrance" on the State's land, although navigational encumbrances are permittable in 
accordance with the littoral owners' littoral rights and the LP A. KEA, wherein this Court 
expressly adopted the Public Trust Doctrine, did not involve a grant of the State's title, it 
involved an application for an encroachment permit for a commercial marina. KEA, 105 Idaho at 
624,632-33, 671 P.2d. 1087, 1095-96. The Public Trust Doctrine applies to IDL's activities in 
issuing encroachment permit under the LP A. 
The second error is the Applicants' conclusion that IDAP A 20.03.04.030.02, which states 
that encroachments not in aid of navigation are approved only in cases involving public benefits, 
establishes the unauthorized standard that there "must not be any detrimental effect" for a 
6 An "encumbrance" is "a claim or liability that is attached to property or some other right and that may 
lessen its value, such as a lien or mortgage; any property right t.lJat is not an ownership interest." Black's Law 
Dictionary, p. 568 (8 th ed. 2004). Such burden on title also constitutes an "impairment." 
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nonnavigational encroachment to be approved by ID1. Respondents' Brief, pp. 35-36. The plain 
language of this rule, however, says nothing about "detrimental effects," and provides that such 
encroachments may be approved if there are major environmental, economic or social benefits to 
the general public. Nonnavigational encroachments are subject to stricter scrutiny because the 
core values protected by the Public Trust Doctrine include water-based navigational uses of the 
lake for commerce, navigation and fisheries and recreation. KEA, 105 Idaho at 625,671 P.2d at 
1088, quoting Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. fllinois, 146 U.S. 387,452 (1892) ("It is a title held in 
trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carryon 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or 
interference of private parties."); KEA, 105 Idaho at 629,671 P.2d at 1092 (this Court will take a 
"close look" at the impacts of a proposed encroachment on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, 
recreation and commerce). 
Finally, Idaho Code title 58, chapter 12, did not purport to limit the Public Trust Doctrine 
as articulated by this Court as applied to navigable waters. Idaho Code title 58, chapter 12, was 
enacted to address concerns that the Public Trust Doctrine might impact water rights or timber 
harvest from State endowment lands. Kearney, James M., Recent Statute Closing the 
Floodgates? Idaho's Statutory Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine, 34 Idaho 1. Rev. 91, 93-
97 (1997). This legislative restriction is reflected in Idaho Code § 58-1203 (2) and (3). The 
Idaho Legislature adopted an accurate definition of the "public trust doctrine" that "means the 
common law rule relating to the title to the beds of navigable waters adopted by inference in 
section 73-116, Idaho Code." Idaho Code § 58-1202(5). IDL is directed to "approve, modify or 
reject all activities involving the alienation or encumbrance of the beds of navigable waters in 
accordance with the public trust doctrine." Idaho Code § 58-1203(1). The Legislature did not 
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alter the standards this Court has set for scrutiny of encumbrances that impact the public interest 
in navigation. The Public Trust Doctrine as defined by Idaho Code title 58, chapter 12, is 
cumulative to IDL's statutory authority pursuant to the LPA. 
Nothing in IDL's actions in tris case, or in its rules contradict Idaho Code title 58, 
chapter 12. 
E. The Applicants Are Not Entitled to Attorney Fees In This Matter. 
With respect to the Applicants' request for attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117, attorney fees are available pursuant to this provision only when the nonprevailing party 
"acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." The record of this case shows that IDL should 
prevail and there is a substantial factual background for IDL's reasonable actions. This Court 
has not previously been called upon to interpret Idaho Code § 58-1302(h), and IDL's legal 
interpretation is reasonable and not meaningfully challenged by the Applicants. There is no 
basis for attorney fees against ID L. 
III. CONCLUSION. 
Based upon the foregoing reasons and authorities, IDL respectfully requests this Court to 
vacate the District Court's rulings on this matter, and to remand the matter to the District Court 
with direction to enter judgment affirming IDL's denial of lake encroachment permit 
applications 219B and 219C. The 219B application had to be denied because IDL may inquire 
into the use of an encroachment as part of its permitting decision, the pilings are not 
navigational, and no purpose was identified for the replacement pilings. The 219C application 
extended unreasonably beyond the line of navigability and infringed upon the littoral rights of 
other landowners in Glengary Bay solely to prevent a wooden-hulled boat from cracking, and 
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was also properly denied. These denials do not prejudice the Applicants' littoral rights and 
ability to seek a navigational encroachment that meets LP A and Public Trust Doctrine standards, 
and should thus be affirmed by this Court. 
DATED this 2nd day of July 2012. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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